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Original Article
In spring 2020, much of life came to a standstill as various 
levels of lockdown swept across the globe to limit the spread 
of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) global pandemic. 
Recommendations for restrictive measures originated from 
medical research scientists such as infectious disease spe-
cialists and epidemiologists, who regularly advised govern-
ments and the public about what to do to curb the pandemic. 
Recommendations included imposing physical distancing 
restrictions, what sorts of establishments would need to be 
closed, when they may reopen, who should stay at home, the 
possibility of a vaccine, and much else that affected people’s 
lives and livelihoods.
In the United States, restrictive measures developed in 
tandem with major tensions, most notably at the national 
level, between scientists’ recommendations and those of 
largely Republican politicians who wanted policy that less-
ened physical restrictions with a goal toward limiting the 
economic repercussions of the pandemic (Mascaro 2020). 
Republican politicians and those representing business inter-
ests made their argument by either discounting the fact 
claims of scientists or by implicitly emphasizing values dif-
ferent from those of scientists, particularly focusing on the 
importance of retaining jobs. The Republican side was led by 
President Trump, who regularly contradicted the views of his 
scientific advisers (Friedman and Plumer 2020). The most 
famous of these scientists was Anthony Fauci, a member of 
the federal Coronavirus Task Force, who regularly appeared 
in the media.
Trump could be reflecting or causing public opinion. In this 
article, we review existing social science research that predicts 
which groups would and would not trust scientists during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Importantly, we distinguish between 
two types of trust: trust that scientists’ knowledge claims are 
generally correct and trust that scientists’ values reflect the 
public’s values. On the basis of prior research, there are four 
general groups that would be expected not to trust pandemic 
scientists: those identifying with the Republican party, mem-
bers of demographic groups such as men with lower levels of 
education who are attracted to populist arguments about 
knowledge and values, African Americans who have a history 
of maltreatment by medical research scientists, and members 
of particular religious groups who have a history of value con-
flict with scientists.
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To address our questions, we use a national survey of 
1,593 adult residents of the United States administered dur-
ing the pandemic. We find that response to COVID-19 scien-
tists is highly politicized. However, it is not Republicans who 
are distinct from independents and Democrats in their skepti-
cism of scientists, but rather it is Democrats who are distinct 
from independents and Republicans in their support. We also 
find that the working-class nonurban men who are most 
responsive to President Trump are not different from others 
in their view of scientists’ knowledge. However, this group is 
much more likely than others to not think scientists share 
their values. As expected, African Americans are less likely 
than whites to exhibit either type of trust in COVID-19 sci-
entists. Contrary to the religion-and-science literature, we 
find that conservative Protestants and Catholics do not trust 
the knowledge of scientists but are not different than the non-
religious in belief that scientists share their values. We end 
by discussing the implications of these findings for how sci-
entists should communicate with the public.
Trust as Both Knowledge and Values
The religion-and-science literature, as well as the literature 
on populism that motivates some of our analyses, both 
make a distinction between knowledge and values (Evans 
2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Therefore, we evaluate 
two aspects of trusting scientists: trusting that they under-
stand the facts about COVID-19 and trusting that they share 
the public’s values when making recommendations or 
decisions.
Scientists involved with responding to the coronavirus 
pandemic make knowledge claims about how viruses spread, 
what actions result in mitigation, which treatments may 
work, what percentage of the infected may need certain treat-
ments, and so on. It is not surprising that scientists make such 
knowledge claims; that is, after all, their main social role. It 
is perhaps less obvious, however, that scientists also make 
implicit value claims in the pandemic. They advocate for 
saving human lives, even at the cost of economic damage, 
even though this value remains implicit. To those who agree 
with this value statement, it may not seem that different from 
a scientific statement. But to those who do not share in this 
value judgement, such as people who prefer to reduce mea-
sures that harm the economy, it is very much independent of 
fact. Scientists in general are perceived by many groups in 
the United States as forwarding a range of values beyond the 
facts at hand (Evans 2018, chapter 7).
This knowledge/value distinction has practical impor-
tance for society’s response to the pandemic. For those who 
value scientific expertise, a rejection of scientists’ ability to 
generate legitimate knowledge claims is very problematic, 
as no one other than scientists can provide the knowledge 
needed to combat a pandemic. Scientists could also be 
excluded from influencing decisions because people do not 
like their values. However, scientists are not experts in 
values, and there are others who can take on that role, such 
as policy makers. Although science is the only profession 
that has the legitimacy to define the facts, others (such as 
governors) can use scientists’ facts to define the values that 
follow.
Expectations from the Literature
There has been one small study of people’s views of scien-
tific expertise on COVID-19 (McFadden et al. 2020). That 
survey, conducted before the virus had spread extensively in 
the United States, found that respondents preferred that the 
directors of federal scientific agencies lead the COVID-19 
response over politicians, but the investigators did not try to 
determine why that was the case or break down this prefer-
ence by the characteristics of the respondents. Given a lack 
of research in this specific domain, we turn to prior litera-
tures that would predict what groups would have less trust in 
scientists researching the pandemic.
Party Identification and the Politicization of Science. In the past 
decade, there has been extensive research on how various 
indicators of support of science have become increasingly 
structured by political identity. In general, studies have found 
that political conservatives and/or those who identify with 
the Republican party are more skeptical of science (Gauchat 
2012, 2015). For example, Gauchat (2015) found that the 
political ideology difference is explained by the scientific 
sophistication and intellectual engagement of respondents. 
Another study showed that the majority of the overall effect 
of political ideology on skepticism about the moral authority 
of science is mediated through beliefs about Christian nation-
alism (Baker, Perry and Whitehead forthcoming).
Beside the associations of certain types of people with the 
Republican Party, and the subsequent views of science, the 
Trump era and the COVID-19 issue may have a different 
mechanism. Although political polarization has been under 
way for decades, Trump has further accelerated this phenom-
enon. For every controversy of the Trump presidency, those 
who identify as Republicans overwhelmingly see whatever 
Trump has done in a favorable light, and Democrats see the 
opposite. For example, Trump wished to “open up” the econ-
omy, and Republicans took up this charge (Rucker et al. 
2020). Political communication is polarized, so Republicans 
generally see the perspective of other Republicans, like 
President Trump (Baum and Groeling 2008).
This suggests a relatively simple direct communication 
mechanism that explains Republican distrust of scientists 
who study COVID-19, which is that Trump has signaled that 
he does not believe the knowledge claims of scientists, and 
Republicans and the associated media sphere are then follow-
ing these views (Friedman and Plumer 2020). Because he 
explicitly bases his policy on his skepticism of the science, 
Trump does not explicitly say that he puts a different value on 
saving lives as do the scientists, so the direct communication 
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mechanism would be operative only for knowledge. Of 
course, following the logic of political polarization, Democrats 
would then hear those disagreeing with Trump, who are med-
ical research scientists such as Anthony Fauci, and believe 
what those scientists are saying.
Many of the existing studies of politicization focus upon 
political ideology (Gauchat 2011, 2012; Noy and O’Brien 
2016; O’Brien and Noy 2015). Those who examine party 
identification typically use a continuous measure of party 
identification from strong Democrats on one end, with 
independents in the middle, to strong Republicans on the 
other end (McCright and Dunlap 2011; O’Brien and Noy 
2015). In studies that separate out Democrats, indepen-
dents, and Republicans rather than placing them on a spec-
trum, there is a common finding that is rarely dwelled upon 
by the authors, which is that Republicans and independents 
have similar sized effects, and it is Democrats who are quite 
different (Evans and Feng 2013:381; Jelen and Lockett 
2014:5). Relatedly, Gauchat (2012:176) found that ideo-
logical moderates and conservatives were both less trusting 
then liberals.
If the Trump direct communication mechanism is occur-
ring, the effect size for independents would not be between 
that of Democrats and Republicans, because a close adher-
ent of Trump’s views would identify as a Republican and 
not an independent. A direct Trump effect would result in 
Republicans’ being less supportive than independents. If 
both are distinct from Democrats, this suggests a Fauci com-
munication mechanism, in which Democrats are unusually 
trusting of scientists.
An unpublished COVID-19 survey study (Lazer et al. 
2020) supports this mechanism. It included the survey ques-
tion “How much do you trust the following people and orga-
nizations to do the right thing to best handle the current 
coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak?” In bivariate analysis, it 
found that Republicans and independents had similar levels 
of trust in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
and “scientists and researchers,” and Democrats had much 
more trust (pp. 152, 163). The authors did not examine if the 
lack of trust was in facts or values.
Therefore, if we find that Republicans are less trusting 
than both independents and Democrats, we can assume a 
Trump direct communication mechanism. If Republicans 
and independents are the same, and it is Democrats who are 
different, we can assume either that Democrats are following 
scientists such as Fauci or that the mechanisms identified in 
the existing literature on party identification are all that exist 
for COVID-19.
Social Class and Gender. Social class and gender are impor-
tant for analysis of trust in scientists with respect to COVID-
19 because of the politicization of the COVID-19 response 
and Trump’s populist appeal to a particular sociodemo-
graphic group. Populists claim “that they speak for the ‘silent 
majority’ of ‘ordinary, decent people,’ whose interests and 
opinions are (they claim) regularly overridden by arrogant 
elites, corrupt politicians and strident minorities” (Canovan 
1999:5). Populists can be from the political right or left, and 
populism is not a set of policy positions but rather is opposi-
tion to whatever the elites in a particular society hold dear. In 
the contemporary United States, the elites include scientists, 
and there is an emerging literature on populism and science 
(Mede and Schäfer 2020).
Populism challenges both the facts and values of scien-
tists. In the words of one theorist of populism, “populism 
challenges not only established power-holders but also elite 
values” (Canovan 1999:3). “The claim is not just that mem-
bers of the establishment are arrogant in their judgments, 
mistaken in their decisions, and blundering in their actions, 
but rather that they are morally wrong in their core values,” 
wrote two other analysts (Norris and Inglehart 2019:4).
The existing literature on populism would suggest a num-
ber of groups predisposed to populist opposition to scientists 
during the U.S. COVID-19 crisis. Populism appeals to those 
who feel disenfranchised and looked down upon by elites, 
and in the contemporary American context, this tends to be 
white, working-class, nonmetropolitan people, particularly 
men (Norris and Inglehart 2019, chapter 10). This is also a 
description of Trump’s “base,” which would be following his 
words closely.
Studies of science and class and gender conducted before 
Trump began explicit populist appeals have a limited set of 
measures and/or show weak and/or inconsistent effects. 
Most studies show that those with more education support 
science more than those with less education, although this is 
usually interpreted as a result of familiarity with science, not 
class position (Bak 2001; Evans 2011; Gauchat 2012). 
Moreover, education is not always a significant predictor 
(Baker et al. forthcoming; Evans 2013; Evans and Feng 
2013).
Family income is not a strong predictor of science views, 
and is not significant in many survey studies (Evans 2013; 
Evans and Feng 2013; Gauchat 2015, 2017). In others, the 
effect is positive or negative depending on which aspect of 
science is under investigation (Baker et al. forthcoming). 
However, with 30,000 cases, Gauchat (2012) did find that 
those with lower incomes show lower levels of confidence in 
those who lead institutional science.
Gauchat (2012) found that men are more confident in sci-
ence, but other studies demonstrated no gender effect (Baker 
et al. forthcoming; Gauchat 2015; Johnson, Scheitle, and 
Ecklund 2015). Yet other studies show women more confi-
dent or supportive of science (Evans 2013; Evans and Feng 
2013). The influence of gender depends on which aspect of 
science is under investigation and the covariates in the 
model.
Race and Ethnicity. Although it is whites in the United States 
who are populists, and thus are less trusting of scientists, on 
issues of medical research African Americans may be even 
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less trusting of scientists than whites. In one summary, “there 
is ample evidence that patient mistrust toward the American 
medical system is to some extent associated with communal 
and individual experiences with racism” (Sullivan 2020:18). 
African Americans have been used for experiments of medi-
cal science against their will dating back to the antebellum 
period, with the infamous mid-twentieth-century Tuskegee 
experiment being only a recent example (Gamble 1997). 
Moreover, racial minorities in general may not trust medical 
science and medical care, as it consistently limits their access 
(Williams and Mohammed 2009). Therefore, we would 
expect African Americans to have less trust than whites. 
Cross-tabulations from the study by Lazer et al. (2020:161) 
suggest that African Americans are slightly less trusting of 
scientists and researchers than were whites.
Religion. In the past 15 years, a very large literature on the 
relationship between religion and science has emerged (Eck-
lund and Scheitle 2018; Evans and Evans 2008; Noy and 
O’Brien 2016; O’Brien and Noy 2015). The traditional aca-
demic view had been that religion, or at least Western Chris-
tianity, is in conflict with science over ways of knowing the 
natural world. The general claim was that the religious look 
to religious texts for claims about nature, and scientists 
would use their senses and reason to determine facts about 
the world. The current sociological conclusion is that 
although this generalization may or may not have been true 
before the mid-twentieth century, it is not so today (Evans 
2018).
Of the largest Christian traditions in the United States, 
there is no modern history of knowledge conflict between 
Catholicism or mainline Protestantism and science. Because 
Catholicism and mainline Protestantism have mechanisms 
for synthesizing science and theology, any contemporary 
knowledge conflict with science would only be with white 
evangelicalism or fundamentalism (Evans 2018) (groups we 
henceforth label white conservative Protestants; Woodberry 
and Smith 1998). This conflict is over only a few narrow fact 
claims for which there are alternative claims in conservative 
Protestant biblical exegesis, mostly concerning human ori-
gins. However, although conservative Protestantism has the 
intellectual capacity to oppose a particular scientific claim, 
there are not alternative conservative Protestant claims about 
virology and epidemiology, so we would not expect this 
group to be less trusting of scientists’ knowledge.
There has been much more extensive conflict between 
religion and science over values. Religious communities do 
not see science as value free but rather as advocating for cer-
tain values. Although for Catholics there are a few isolated 
value conflicts over issues such as embryonic stem cell 
research and human genetic modification (Evans 2010), this 
would not be expected to apply to the science of pandemics. 
On the other hand, conservative Protestants have a more than 
100-year history of rejecting the values they see as being 
taught by scientists through claims about human evolution, 
such as their observation that Darwinism was used to pro-
mote eugenics. Conservative Protestants extrapolate from 
these conflicts to see value conflict with scientists in any 
arena of science (Evans 2018:77–84, 128, 140). If a conser-
vative Protestant response to more symbolic issues such as 
human evolution also applies to viral disease, we would then 
expect conservative Protestants to be more likely to think 
that the values of scientists will be inconsistent with their 
own in decisions and recommendations about COVID-19. 
On the other hand, if respondents are not simply reacting to 
the term scientist but perceive that the values expressed by 
the scientists concern saving lives, this would be perceived 
as consistent with the teachings in the Christian tradition.
The polarized Trump era has potentially upended these 
traditional explanations from the literature. Like the expecta-
tions about political party identification, whereby certain 
people are following (or opposing) the messages of Trump, 
members of certain religious traditions may be directly fol-
lowing Trump’s views of scientists’ ability to generate 
knowledge, overpowering the more subtle influence of their 
traditions identified in the literature.
The most prominent group of Trump supporters are white 
conservative Protestants, and there is a large literature dedi-
cated to explaining their support (Gorski 2017; Margolis 
2020; Marti 2019). Less remarked upon, but equally trans-
gressive to historical patterns, is that white Catholics also 
disproportionately voted for Trump, as indicated by his 
larger margin among Catholic voters compared with previ-
ous Republican presidential nominees (Martinez and Smith 
2016; Rozell 2018:286). Therefore, although generalized 
theories of religious reaction to scientific knowledge claims 
would not predict conservative Protestant or Catholic oppo-
sition to COVID-19 scientists, the fact that the president 
whom they earnestly support is the one contradicting scien-




We surveyed a national sample of U.S. adults about their 
experiences with COVID-19 from May 4 to 8, 2020. We con-
tracted with the online survey firm Cint to reach respondents 
who could access our survey on the Qualtrics platform using 
either a computer or a mobile device. Cint is an opt-in poll, 
and research in the past decade has shown “few or no signifi-
cant differences between traditional modes [of survey admin-
istration] and opt-in online survey approaches” (Ansolabehere 
and Schaffner 2018:89). We set quotas for age, gender, edu-
cation, and region to reflect U.S. census figures. Cint’s 
respondent pool includes more than 15 million people gath-
ered through a double opt-in procedure. Potential respon-
dents are initially contacted through telephone, face-to-face 
interactions, e-mail, social media, and banner ads. After 
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potential participants fill out a form, they receive an e-mail 
that requires logging into their Cint accounts to become part 
of the panel. Cint then e-mails potential respondents about 
studies and compensates them with a small remuneration for 
their participation. Cint-generated samples have been used 
for other social science research (e.g., Hunsaker, Hargittai, 
and Piper 2020).
A few minutes into the survey, we asked an elaborate 
attention-verification question that screened out people who 
did not answer it correctly (this was a slight modification of 
the color question by Berinsky et al. 2016:22). We have valid 
data on 1,593 adult respondents. At the start of data collec-
tion, there were 1,172,921 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in 
the United States and 62,593 deaths, and an average of 1,936 
deaths on each of those days (Wikipedia 2020). The New 
York metropolitan area was, at the time of the survey, the 
epicenter of the U.S. outbreak. There were cases in all 50 
states (New York Times 2020). The public discourse while 
the survey was in the field concerned states’ “reopening” 
their economies in contradiction to warnings from scientists 
(Roy 2020).
Measures: Dependent Variables
To measure if a respondent trusts the fact claims of scientists, 
the survey asked, “On a scale of 1-5 where 1 means ‘Very 
well’ and 5 means ‘Not at all,’ how well do the following 
groups understand the spread of Coronavirus (COVID-19)?” 
Of the six groups, one was “Scientists who study pandem-
ics.” For all such variables in this article, higher values are 
associated with more of the quality in question, so in this 
case, a respondent received a 1 if he or she thought scientists 
understood “not at all” and a 5 if he or she thought they 
understood “very well.” To measure value conflict with sci-
entists, our survey asked, “If scientists who study pandemics 
have to decide life and death in the Coronavirus pandemic, 
the values they use will be consistent with mine.” Respondents 
were given the choice of five responses ranging from 
“strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5).
Measures: Independent Variables
Party Identification. To measure party identification, we used 
the American National Election Studies (2020) question 
“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a 
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” We cre-
ated dummy variables for each of these three categories, and 
Democrat was the reference group in the models.
Social Class. Given the mixed findings in the existing litera-
ture on the effect of social class on views of science, we fit 
our operationalization to our particular analytic focus on the 
possible impact of populism. For contemporary American 
populism, gender and class are intertwined, as it is not men 
or the working class per se that are thought to be populist, but 
working-class men (Norris and Inglehart 2019, chapter 10). 
Therefore, we created dummy variables for lower income 
men (base in the models), lower income women, higher 
income men, and higher income women. For gender, we 
asked, “Are you male, female or other?” (Two respondents 
who selected other were excluded from further analyses.) We 
also asked for total household income before taxes, with 13 
choices ranging from less than $10,000 to $250,000 or more. 
Recoding each response to the midpoint of the category, the 
bottom 52 percent of the sample (cut at $45,000 or less) were 
placed into the respective lower income dummies. Although 
many analysts would include race in the variables above, we 
needed to keep the race variables distinct to analyze the 
effect of being African American.
Education is a critical social class variable that has largely 
been interpreted as a proxy for exposure to science. Having 
only a high school education or less could also be a proxy for 
working-class position. We asked about educational attain-
ment using six categories and created three dummy vari-
ables: high school education or less, some college, and 
college degree or more, with high school or less as the base 
in the models. Finally, populist rejection of expertise, as well 
as the Trump base, is thought to be centered in rural and 
small-town areas. A question asked, “How would you 
describe the type of community you live in?” with the choices 
being “a big city,” “the suburbs or outskirts of a big city,” “a 
town or a small city,” and “a rural area.” We created dummy 
variables for each of these, with “big city” as the reference 
group.
Race and Ethnicity. We asked respondents separately about 
their ethnicity and race, as is done on the U.S. census forms. 
First, we asked, “Are you of Hispanic or Latino descent?” 
with “yes” and “no” answer options. Second, we asked, 
“Please check one or more categories below to indicate what 
race or races you consider yourself to be,” with the follow-
ing answer options: “White,” “Black/African American,” 
“Asian,” “American Indian or Alaska Native,” “Native 
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander,” and “Other, please specify.” 
When possible, we recategorized those who chose “other” 
on the basis of the information they provided (e.g., 27 of the 
45 indicated Hispanic or Latinx origin). We recoded race 
and ethnicity into mutually exclusive categories so that if a 
person indicated two races, he or she received the value of 
the one associated with the lower social status. We thus have 
dummy variables for white, African American, Hispanic, 
Asian American, and Native American (a summary of the 
two Native questions). We use white as the reference group.
Religion. In the United States, religiosity (in contrast to 
identity or belief) is often measured by the amount of reli-
gious service attendance. For our study we had to replace 
this traditional measurement given that during our data col-
lection, the vast majority of religious services were shut 
down. Instead, we asked a different question commonly 
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used (Johnson et al. 2015) to measure strength of religios-
ity: “To what extent do you consider yourself a religious 
person?” Possible answers were “not at all religious” (1), 
“slightly religious” (2), “moderately religious” (3), and 
“very religious” (4).
We also asked a set of religious identity questions. The 
first was “What religion do you consider yourself to be? If 
more than one, click the one that best describes you.” 
Closely following Ecklund and Scheitle (2018:158), choices 
were “Protestant,” “Catholic,” “Just a Christian,” “Jewish,” 
“Mormon,” “Muslim,” “Eastern Orthodox,” “Buddhist,” 
“Hindu,” “Not religious,” “Agnostic,” “Atheist,” and 
“Something else” (with a write-in box). As expected, there 
were far too few respondents who selected “Jewish,” 
“Mormon,” “Muslim,” “Eastern Orthodox,” “Buddhist,” 
and “Hindu” for separate analysis, so we combined these 
into an uninterpreted “other religion” dummy variable. This 
is included in models to produce the proper comparison. All 
of the 8 percent of respondents who selected “something 
else” were also assigned this variable, except for those we 
describe below who were recoded into other dummy vari-
ables. Four respondents who did not answer this first ques-
tion were excluded from analysis.
Those who selected “Catholic” were coded as Catholics. 
Those who selected “Not religious,” “Agnostic,” or “Atheist” 
were assigned a nonreligious dummy variable, as were the 
eight respondents who expressed nonreligion (e.g., “None”) 
when providing supplemental description for the “Something 
else” category. Following the self-reported identification 
measurement strategy used in the sociology of religion 
(Dougherty, Johnson, and Polson 2007), those who selected 
“Protestant” or “Just a Christian” were asked an additional 
Protestant identity question in which the choices were “fun-
damentalist,” “conservative Protestant,” “evangelical,” 
“mainline Protestant,” “liberal Protestant,” and “none of the 
above.” The first three were assigned a conservative 
Protestant dummy variable, and the mainline and liberal 
Protestants were assigned to the liberal Protestant identity 
dummy variable.
It is a growing challenge for surveys in American religion 
that Americans are increasingly “connected to congrega-
tions, but less so to denominations or more generic religious 
identity labels” (Dougherty et al. 2007:483). That is, many 
respondents whom academics would classify as belonging to 
a particular Protestant tradition either do not know that they 
are Protestants and do not recognize that label in a survey, do 
not recognize or reject any of the identity labels used in the 
Protestant community, do not know if their church is a mem-
ber of a particular denomination, and/or reject any identity 
beyond “Christian” (Lehman and Sherkat 2018). In this sam-
ple, 37.4 percent of those asked the specific Protestant iden-
tity question selected “none of the above.” A good portion of 
these respondents who selected “none of the above” do not 
recognize or use the term Protestant. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that 49 percent of those asked the specific Protestant 
identity question were asked because they selected “Just a 
Christian” on the first question. But 76.8 percent of those 
who ultimately rejected a specific Protestant identity selected 
“Just a Christian” on the first question. Many of these spe-
cific-identity-rejecting Protestants are nonetheless quite 
involved with religion and are, by academic standards, 
essentially a different type of Protestant.
We therefore created a dummy for these identity-rejecting 
yet involved Protestants and also included the 71 of 127 
respondents who, in writing in an “other” religion, wrote 
something that was clearly Protestant (e.g., “Adventist”). It is 
difficult to describe this no-specific-identity group, and fur-
ther investigation is in its beginning stages (Woodberry et al. 
2012:69). In theological beliefs and perspectives on social 
issues, these nonidentifying Protestants are between conser-
vative and liberal Protestants (Lehman and Sherkat 2018:783).
A Protestantism that rejects the theological traditions and 
doctrines associated with these labels is a type of populist 
Protestantism that does not need theories and doctrines, just 
personal experience. For example, “seeker” conservative 
Protestant churches that eschew labels and would just call 
themselves “Christian” deemphasize doctrine (Miller 
1997:129). Consistent with this being a populist form of reli-
gion, analysis (not shown) reveals that 34 percent of those 
we classify as conservative Protestant have undergraduate 
degrees, while only 15 percent of the non-specific-identity 
group do. Therefore, this is a particularly antiestablishment 
type of Protestantism, and given that mainline Protestantism 
is defined by its connection to the establishment (Wuthnow 
and Evans 2002), it is a type of conservative Protestantism.
The general expectation from the sociology of religion 
would be that religion will influence respondents’ views only 
if they participate in or are knowledgeable about their reli-
gion. We therefore took all of those assigned to the above 
Christian dummy variables who also claimed that they were 
“not at all religious” and assigned them to a “low-participa-
tion Christian” dummy variable. In sum, we have dummy 
variables for Catholics, conservative Protestants, liberal 
Protestants, non-specific-identity Protestants, low-participa-
tion Christians, members of other religions, and the nonreli-
gious (the reference group in the models).
Possible Confounding Variables. Finally, we control for two 
potentially confounding variables. The first is age, and we 
asked respondents, “In what year were you born?” subtract-
ing it from the year of data collection, which was 2020. The 
second is the extent to which the respondent is paying atten-
tion to the pandemic. All of the substantive effects presume 
that respondents are aware of scientists’ claims in the pan-
demic, but this awareness may be structured by having the 
time or motivation to be attentive to the news of the pan-
demic. For example, working-class respondents’ views of 
scientists may be because their class position does not allow 
them the time to follow what scientists are saying, not 
because of substantive views of scientists that flow from 
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their class experience. To measure attentiveness, we used a 
question that asked, “How closely, if at all, have you been 
following news about the outbreak of the Coronavirus also 
known as COVID-19?” Respondents were given four options 
that ranged between “not at all closely” (coded as 1) and 
“very closely” (coded as 4).
The Sample
The mean and median age of the sample is 48 years (range = 
18–93 years), and just over half of respondents are women 
(54 percent). Just under half (47 percent) have no more than a 
high school degree, a fifth (19 percent) have completed some 
college, and the remaining third (34 percent) have at least a 
college degree. Fewer than two thirds of participants (63 per-
cent) are white, 16 percent identify as Hispanic, 12 percent as 
African American, 6 percent as Asian or Asian American, and 
less than 2 percent as Native American or Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander. The average household income is just under $55,000. 
More than a third of respondents (37 percent) report living in 
the suburbs, 23 percent in a small city or town, 22 percent in 
a big city, and 17 percent in a rural area.
In terms of religiosity, a fifth are Catholic, 12 percent are 
other, and 21 percent are nonreligious. Eleven and a half per-
cent identify as some type of Christian but say they are 
“not at all religious,” a group we call “low-participation 
Christians.” Just over 17 percent are Protestants who think 
of themselves as more strongly religious but who do not 
adhere to established Protestant identities (the non-specific-
identity Protestants). Seventeen percent are more strongly 
religious with a conservative Protestant identity, and 7 per-
cent are more strongly religious with a liberal Protestant iden-
tity. These figures are consistent with other recent surveys.1
Republicans and Democrats are represented at about 
equal levels (34 percent and 35 percent, respectively), the 
remaining claiming that they are either independent or have 
no preference. Just over half of respondents (52 percent) 
claimed to be following news about the outbreak of the coro-
navirus very closely, 37 percent somewhat closely, 9 percent 
not too closely, and 2 percent not at all.
Results
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for the variables in the 
analysis. Most important, the dependent variable measuring 
whether scientists who study pandemics understand the 
spread of COVID-19 is skewed toward agreeing, with just 
under half (45.9 percent) selecting 5 (“very well”), 20.4 per-
cent selecting 4, 15.3 percent selecting 3, 10.2 percent select-
ing 2, and just 8.2 percent selecting 1 (“not well at all”). This 
represents fairly strong agreement that scientists understand 
pandemics. The public is much more divided on whether sci-
entists share their values, however, with just over a fifth 
(21.5 percent) selecting 5 (“strongly agree” that the values of 
researchers are consistent with theirs,), 32.5 percent select-
ing 4, 37.3 percent selecting 3, 6.0 percent selecting 2, and 
2.8 percent selecting 1 (“strongly disagree”).
We use ordered logistic regression models because the 
dependent variables are ordered categorical measures. The 
first column of results in Table 2 shows ordered logistic coef-
ficients for a model predicting the “understand” variable. Both 
Republicans and independents are less likely than Democrats 
to think scientists understand the spread of COVID-19. This is 
not consistent with a theory of direct influence by President 
Trump on Republicans but rather is consistent with the mecha-
nisms in the existing literature, whereby it is Democrats who 
are unusual in their faith in scientists.
African Americans are less likely than white people to 
think scientists understand the spread of coronavirus. This 
probably reflects African Americans’ skepticism about medi-
cal researchers due to past research injustices. Catholics and 
conservative Protestants are less likely than the nonreligious 
to think scientists understand COVID-19. This is not consis-
tent with the existing literature but is with a direct Trump 
influence mechanism. None of the sociodemographic class 
variables are significant. Older people are more likely to 
think scientists understand COVID-19.2
We rely on the models in Table 2 for statistical signifi-
cance, but it is difficult to interpret effect size for ordered 
1Of course, these numbers all differ slightly because of the myriad 
strategies used to measure and differentiate religion, particularly for 
Protestants. But, for example, a 2014 survey on religion and science 
identified conservative Protestants at 25 percent, other Protestants 
at 20 percent, Catholics at 24 percent, “other religion” at 15 per-
cent, and nonreligious at 16 percent (Salazar et al. 2019:6). Before 
our religiosity screen, our sample includes both types of Protestants 
combined (40 percent), Catholics (23 percent), “other religion” (12 
percent), and nonreligious (21 percent).
2One assumption in an ordered logistic model (OLM) is the parallel 
regression or proportional odds assumption (Long and Freese 2014: 
326). That is, the effect of a variable on the difference between the 
first category of the dependent variable on the rest of the categories 
should be the same as the effect of the first and second combined on 
the remaining categories, and so on. If that is not true, then the regu-
lar OLM coefficient is too much of a generalization and potentially 
misleading. Most OLMs actually violate this assumption (Long and 
Freese 2014:331). We diagnose the proportional odds assumption 
using the gologit2 program (Williams 2006) (results not shown). 
A nonparallel effect is typically one that increases or decreases in 
strength as the algorithm continues up the dependent variable scale. 
Occasionally, the nonparallelism is caused by the effect’s wavering 
in strength as it progresses up the scale. For the model reported in 
the first results column of Table 2, the rural residence variable is 
nonparallel, and fluctuates in size and direction, but is always not 
significant. Given that all of these are nonsignificant, this has no 
substantive impact on our interpretation. The age variable has the 
same magnitude for the comparisons until the last, for which it is 
approximately half the size of the earlier. But all are significant, so 
this represents a level of detail far above the generalization we 
need for our purposes. For conservative Protestants, the general 
OLM coefficient hides a pattern that, although interesting, does not 
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logistic regression models. To understand the magnitude of 
these effects, in Table 3 we show selected predicted probabil-
ities. Predicted probabilities are descriptions of hypothetical 
individuals in the data who vary by an important interpretive 
variable (Long and Freese 2014:355).
The first and second lines in Table 3 represent an African 
American and a white respondent, respectively.3 An African 
Table 1. Sample Characteristics.
Percentage Mean SD Minimum Maximum n
Age 48.1 16.6 18 93 1,588
Female 54.3 1,589
Male 45.7  
Household income $61,320 $54,782 $5,000 $300,000 1,589
Income × gender
 Low-income men 20.4  
 Low-income women 31.3  
 High-income men 25.3  
 High-income women 23.1  
Race/ethnicity 1,591
 White 63.4  
 Hispanic 16.2  
 Black/African American 12.4  
 Asian 6.2  
 American Native 1.6  
Education 1,593
 High school or less 47.0  
 Some college 19.0  
 Bachelor’s or higher 34.1  
Metro status 1,593
 Big city 22.3  
 Small city/town 22.9  
 Suburb 37.4  
 Rural 17.5  
Religion 1,590
 Catholic 20.1  
 Strong no-identity Christian 17.3  
 Conservative Protestant 16.9  
 Liberal Protestant 7.1  
 Low participation Christian 5.8  
 Other 11.5  
 Nonreligious 21.3  
Party identification 1,578
 Republican 34.3  
 Independent 30.3  
 Democrat 35.4  
Follows coronavirus news 3.38 .748 1 4 1,593
Scientists understand pandemic 3.86 1.32 1 5 1,593
Scientists share respondent’s values 3.64 .97 1 5 1,592
affect our substantive conclusion. Between believing that scientists 
understand “not at all” and the higher confidence responses, con-
servative Protestants are more likely than the nonreligious to have 
confidence in scientists (but this only reaches a p value of .06). The 
next comparison is near zero and is not significant, but the final two 
comparisons are significant but in the opposite direction of the first. 
Therefore, conservative Protestants are most different from the non-
religious in the statements of strong confidence in scientists.
3When producing predicted probabilities, the variables not under 
analysis need to be set either at their mean values or at substantive 
values. The mean of age and the extent to which the respondent 
is following the COVID-19 news are legitimately continuous vari-
ables, and therefore these are set at their means. The other variables 
are categorical, so it does not make sense to take the average of 
something like a religion dummy variable, as an individual cannot 
be 20 percent Catholic. Therefore, a hypothetical individual must 
be compared. When not in the substantive comparison, living area 
is set at city, gender and income at lower income male, party iden-
tification at Democrat, race at white, education at the middle cat-
egory of some college, and religion at Catholic.
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American has a probability of .11 of selecting the response 
that scientists understand not at all, while a white respondent 
has a probability of .07. On the other end of the continuum, 
the probability of an African American’s selecting the 
response that scientists understand very well is .35, whereas 
the probability for a white respondent is .48. A visual meta-
phor also contributes to understanding. If we metaphorically 
imagine these probabilities representing 100 people sorting 
themselves into five rooms by these categories, the fifth 
African American room would have 35 people in it, and the 
fifth white room would have 48.
The next sections of Table 3 show comparisons of a 
Republican versus a Democrat and a Catholic versus a non-
religious respondent. Those substantive differences are less 
powerful than the race difference. The final section combines 
identities to show a hypothetical Catholic Republican versus 
a nonreligious Democrat. At the response categories that 
reflect the least trust in scientists’ knowledge, the probability 
that a Catholic Republican will select the response that scien-
tists understand “not at all” is double the probability of a 
nonreligious Democrat making that choice. At the other end 
of the scale, the probability that a Catholic Republican will 
select the response that scientists understand “very well” is 
.41, and the probability that a nonreligious Democrat will 
make that selection is .60.
Returning to Table 2, the second results column reports 
the coefficients for the shared values model, and as expected, 
African Americans are much less likely to think that scien-
tists share their values. Older people also think that scientists 
do not share their values. Similar to the previous model, 
Republicans and independents are much less likely than 
Democrats to think that scientists share their values. By and 
large, the religious and nonreligious are not different in the 
extent they believe scientists share their values. The 
Table 2. Ordered Logistic Regression on Belief in Scientists’ Understanding of the Pandemic and Whether They Share Respondent’s 
Values.
Understanding Values
High-income men −.014 (.149) .336* (.149)
High-income women −.004 (.150) .043 (.151)
Low-income women .140 (.137) .130 (.139)
Republican −.307* (.125) −.535*** (.124)
Independent −.311* (.122) −.633*** (.121)
Follows coronavirus news .282*** (.066) .517*** (.067)
Race/ethnicity (base: white)
 Black/African American −.544** (.159) −.465** (.162)
 Asian −.159 (.205) −.235 (.204)
 Hispanic −.128 (.135) −.115 (.134)
 American Native −.114 (.371) .446 (.385)
Education (base: high school or less)
 Some college .129 (.129) .062 (.131)
 Bachelor’s or higher .159 (.122) .217 (.119)
Age .018*** (.003) −.011*** (.003)
Metropolitan status (base: big city)
 Suburb .020 (.130) −.467*** (.130)
 Small city/town .008 (.147) −.458** (.146)
 Rural −.149 (.159) −.446** (.161)
Religion (base: non–religious)
 Catholic −.459** (.153) .068 (.149)
 Conservative Protestant −.350* (.160) −.168 (.163)
 Liberal Protestant −.043 (.217) .149 (.208)
 Other −.387* (.179) .058 (.176)
 Low-participation Christian .132 (.236) −.266 (.219)
 Strong no-identity Christian −.256 (.150) −.475** (.156)
Cut1 −1.112*** (.307) −3.252*** (.330)
Cut2 −.168 (.302) −2.020*** (.306)
Cut3 .686* (.302) .328 (.302)
Cut4 1.586*** (.304) 1.938*** (.305)
n 1,579 1,578  
Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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exception is the difficult-to-characterize group of non-spe-
cific-identity Protestants, who are less likely than the nonre-
ligious to think that scientists share their values.
Most notable is that the social class groups thought to 
be amenable to populism also think that scientists do not 
share their values. Specifically, compared with low-income 
men, high-income men are more likely to think scientists 
share their values. Both classes of women are not different 
from the lower income men. Those living in rural areas, 
small towns, and suburbs are less likely to think they have 
shared values with scientists than those who live in cities. 
The only class variable that is not significant is education, 
for which the undergraduate degree variable (with high 
school as the reference group) falls just short of statistical 
significance.4
Table 4 shows the differences in selected predicted 
probabilities for the values model. As individual character-
istics, these effects are not large, but comparison of com-
mon combined identities produces larger differences. For 
example, a lower income male, Republican, strong no-
specific-identity Christian who resides in a small town has a 
predicted probability of .11 of strongly agreeing that scien-
tists share their values, whereas a higher income male, non-
religious Democrat who lives in a city has a predicted 
probability of .42.
Discussion
As of this writing, the COVID-19 pandemic continues. Even if 
it is ultimately controlled, there will be similar challenges in 
the future. Beyond a contribution to academic debates about 
the public’s view of expertise (Eyal 2019), understanding 
which members of the U.S. polity trust and do not trust scien-
tists researching the novel coronavirus is critically important 
for those who design a public response to pandemics.
There are a number of limitations of this analysis. Given 
the spread of the virus to different locations in the United 
States, which suggests different levels of public attention and 
threat, as well as the changes in how various public figures 
talk about COVID-19, it is possible that the same survey 
conducted two months later might have resulted in different 
findings. Second, we look for uniqueness in the COVID-19 
case by testing if known relationships between social groups 
and science are operative, but we do not control for attitudes 
toward science in general to see if the COVID-19 case stands 
out. Future work should ask about both the unique situation 
at hand and science more generally.
Our research makes several distinct contributions. We 
split our analysis of trust between knowledge and values. As 
expected, the historical lack of trust between African 
Americans and medical research scientists continues into the 
present crisis. Scientists should be aware that the legacy of 
past research injustices is likely to mean that African 
Americans will tend to think both that scientists’ facts about 
COVID-19 are wrong and that the values scientists are 
implicitly promoting are not in line with theirs.
The religion-and-science literature predicted that there 
would be no effect of religion on belief in science’s abilities 
to generate true knowledge, but our model shows that 
Catholics and conservative Protestants are less likely than 
the nonreligious to think scientists understand COVID-19. A 
challenge in this literature is that because of the varied ways 
of measuring and categorizing religion in a survey, as well as 
the use of different reference groups, research is very diffi-
cult to compare. That said, we speculate that because there is 
Table 3. Predicted Probabilities for Believing That Scientists Understand Coronavirus Disease 2019.
Not at All (1) 2 3 4 Very Well (5)
Race
 Black/African American .111 .132 .187 .220 .350
 White .068 .090 .148 .214 .481
Party identification
 Democrat .068 .090 .148 .214 .481
 Republican .090 .113 .171 .221 .406
Religion
 Catholic .068 .090 .148 .214 .481
 Nonreligious .044 .062 .111 .188 .595
Ideal-types
 Catholic Republican .090 .113 .171 .221 .406
 Nonreligious Democrat .044 .062 .111 .188 .595
4In the parallel regression diagnostics, the “following the news” 
variable fluctuates in effect size, with each comparison being sta-
tistically significant. The Native American effect fluctuates as well, 
with no comparison reaching significance. The “other religion” 
dummy fluctuates, but this is not an interpretable variable, being 
in the model only to achieve the proper comparison with the other 
religion variables. The independent political affiliation variable 
fluctuates in the size of its effect. The male upper income variable 
is not significant in the difference between the first and second cat-
egory or in the final comparison. It is very powerful in the middle of 
the range. This adds some subtle detail to this relationship, but our 
interpretation of the regular OLM coefficient is a good generaliza-
tion for the purposes of this article.
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no religious counterclaim regarding infectious disease in 
either tradition, these findings represent a direct Trump com-
munication effect: these are the two religious groups in the 
United States who have, up until now, been Trump’s greatest 
supporters.
Trump is not explicitly criticizing the values of scientists, 
and we therefore find no religion influence on values, with 
one exception. Although the existing literature would expect 
white conservative Protestants to oppose the values of scien-
tists, this literature has largely examined issues of human 
origins. On the particular issue of COVID-19, scientists’ 
implicit value of saving lives would be consistent with at 
least the theological views taught in these traditions.
The one religious group who think scientists do not share 
their values is the difficult-to-describe non-specific-identity 
Protestants. This growing group in American religion has not 
been extensively studied, but a religious group based on 
rejecting religious traditions and institutions may well be 
prone to rejecting other institutions, such as science. We can 
tentatively think of this as a particularly populist version of 
conservative Protestantism. Future researchers will need to 
determine the underlying mechanisms behind these mixed 
religion effects.
The existing literature on political identity and science 
shows that conservatives and moderates (Gauchat 2012) or 
Republicans and independents (Evans and Feng 2013; Jelen 
and Lockett 2014) are collectively different from liberals 
and Democrats. We see the same in this study. This means 
that there is not a direct Trump communication effect, 
because that effect would not affect independents. Rather, 
there is either a direct Fauci communication effect, whereby 
Democrats are particularly attuned to follow scientists, or 
whatever it is in the existing literature that leads to 
Republicans’ and independents’ being much more skeptical 
of science than Democrats also applies to a life-or-death sci-
entific issue such as COVID-19.
Finally, we focused on the effects of social class and gen-
der because nonmetropolitan, working-class men have been 
the target of Trump’s populist appeal. They, along with con-
servative Christians, have been Trump’s “base.” That there 
are no class effects in the understanding-COVID-19 model 
suggests that there is no direct Trump communication mech-
anism to his base, because Trump has been explicit only 
about rejecting scientific claims. The populism literature 
does predict that those attracted to populism would reject all 
elite knowledge claims, but the fact that we do not see rejec-
tion in the case of COVID-19 suggests that this populist 
rejection does not extend to issues of life and death. This 
may be because populism is more of a protest statement than 
an actual theory of knowledge: populism may be a type of 
symbolic status politics. It is consistent with this interpreta-
tion that we find effects on the more symbolic statement of 
thinking that scientists do not share one’s values.
Conclusion
Why do some groups not trust Fauci? Overall, we see very 
limited evidence of a direct Trump communication effect 
when it comes to believing that scientists understand the pan-
demic. The mechanisms we see in the attitudes toward sci-
ence literature are also in effect for Covid-19, with the 
exception of the effects of class not applying to a life-or-
death scientific issue and a religious clash over values not 
applying to COVID-19.
We offer some concrete suggestions for those who want 
scientists to be more influential in the public sphere during 
the COVID-19 crisis. The descriptive results of the two 
dependent variables in this study suggest that the public is 








 Black/African American .016 .036 .312 .377 .259
 White .010 .023 .231 .378 .357
Party identification
 Democrat .010 .023 .231 .378 .357
 Republican .017 .039 .325 .374 .246
Residence
 Big city residence .010 .023 .231 .378 .357
 Small city/town residence .016 .036 .312 .377 .258
Gender and income
 Low-income man .017 .039 .325 .374 .246
 High-income man .012 .028 .265 .382 .313
Ideal-types
 Low-income man, Republican, small city/town, no-identity Protestant .045 .094 .489 .267 .106
 High-income man, Democrat, big-city resident, nonreligious .008 .018 .190 .363 .421
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more likely to think that scientists understand COVID-19 
than to think that they agree with the values used by scien-
tists in the COVID-19 pandemic. Particularly for non-Dem-
ocrat, working-class men in nonurban settings, which is 
Trump’s base, indications that scientists are inevitably 
expressing their values may lead to less support for scien-
tists’ involvement in COVID-19 policy.
This results in a pragmatic recommendation. Ideally, 
Fauci and other scientists would stick to description and not 
proscription, leaving to nonscientists the advocacy for the 
value of saving lives and the like. Many governors have 
advocated for these values while relying upon facts gener-
ated by scientists. This role of developing facts on which 
policy is based would be the one for scientists most sup-
ported by the public. Unfortunately, for those who believe in 
the value of prioritizing lives, scientists such as Fauci are the 
only prominent federal-level advocates of that value, which 
puts them in a bind. Although there may not be an easy solu-
tion at the federal level, it is important to be aware of the 
social determinants of support for scientists in the coronavi-
rus pandemic. Most Americans do believe scientists’ claims 
about COVID-19; how that gets translated into value-laden 
policy recommendations is more complicated.
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